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I. Introduction
Determining security measures for a wireless network is no different than
determining a strategy for traditional wired networks. Network administrators survey the
possible exploitations that a hacker could use and than determine which measures would
protect from such attacks. A network administrator must weight the risk associated with
the attack against the costs ofprotecting against the attack.
Many articles have recently been published about both the perils and promise of
wireless networks. Increased worker productivity, ubiquitous network access, and instant
gratification are just a few of the benefits employees can utilize with a wireless network.
These articles also discuss many of the vulnerabilities ofwireless networks, with topics
ranging from AirSnort toWEP cracking.
In order for wireless networks to be effective in business those that deploy them
must determine the expectations of the wireless network and then take into account the
risks associated with that type of network deployment. Vendors in the software and
hardware industry have filled the market with proprietary products that can allow the
deployment of wireless networks. This paper will not explore the many proprietary
solutions on the market. While these networks will function using a specific vendor's
product they do not remain accessible by another manufacturer. A wired network allows
different operating systems, different network card adapters, and different network
connectivity hardware to communicate
and so should a wireless network.
The primary goal of a network is to get data from one point to another,
and a
secure network ensures that the data transmitted does not get intercepted en route. An
important feature of a secure network is that only authorized devices or people
could gain
access to receive and transmit data. Wired networks use switches to limit a packet's
exposure on the network and eavesdropping is difficult, but not impossible, through
wiretaps. A packet on a wireless network travels out in all directions as far as the sending
device is capable of transmitting.
Security must also be weighed against usability. A highly secure network could
require fourteen random character user passwords and biometric identification. While
this network would be secure it would not be useful to many people and would probably
be overkill for most business applications. A wide open, truly plug and play network
would allow anyone access to anything. Employees can access all the data they need for
their job, but attackers would also enjoy this unfettered access. Network administrators
have to keep the usability of the network in mind when devising security measures to
counter the risks to the network.
This paper will explore the some of the risks that accompany the use of wireless
networks. Six different scenarios will be presented. The first will be a wireless network
with no security measures in place. The second scenario will introduce security measures
controlled by the network hardware. The third scenario will use security designed
specifically for wireless networks.
The fourth scenario will use only security measures
offered through operating systems. A fifth scenario will employ a third party to control
security of the network. And a final sixth scenario will use all three: operating system,
network, and third party security measures. Each scenario will also check
vulnerabilities
to network clients, servers, and to the packets being transmitted. Following manufacturer
instructions the security measures will be implemented by computer literate testers that
have no specific wireless security training. The same group will also rate the end user
accessibility of the network. At the end of this paper network administrators will have an
understanding of the risks associated with wireless networks and the costs of
implementing security measures to reduce those risks.
Wireless technology has developed rapidly during the time this paper was being
written. This paper was written using the technologies available during the summer of
2003. Advanced securitymeasures such as WPA and 802. lx are not included in the body
of this paper but are briefly described in the Appendix. Methods of breaking into
wireless networks have also matured along with security. This paper looks at exploits
that were commonly available during the summer of 2003 .
II. Wireless Network Attacks Explained
Wireless networks by default are insecure. The same network features that allow
users to roam from room to room and not lose connectivity allow hackers access to that
same network. Wireless network attacks attempt to view the data being transmitted over
the air and gain access to the wired network and its resources.
The first step in hacking a network is reconnaissance. Wireless networks freely
give out their system service identifiers (SSIDs). In order for a client to connect to an
access point the client must know the SSID of that access point. By default access points
broadcast their SSID into the air so that clients can determine which access points are
within range that they can connect to (Linksys 12). Linksys, for example, sets the default
SSID for all their networking hardware
-
access points and client adapters
- to 'linksys'.
This practice allows a network administrator to simply plug in and turn on any Linksys
device and they will automatically be able to communicate with each other. In addition
to being broadcast by the access point, every wireless packet contains the SSID in plain
text (Wi-Fi Planet).
Netstumbler is a free tool available for network administrators to test the strength
of their access point signals. This tool also doubles as a first strike weapon that allows
hackers to find the SSIDs of access points. As shown in Figure 1, Netstumbler lists the
access point's MAC address, the broadcasted SSID as well as determining if Wired
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Figure 1 Netstumbler locating access points
Once a hacker has the SSID used for communication the next step would likely be
the capturing of packets.
Ethereal is another free tool that can aid administrators in
diagnosing network problems and also give hackers an eye on what is being transmitted
through the air. If no encryption is used Ethereal can view everything in the packets:
including usernames and passwords. This is not an exclusive vulnerability to wireless
networks however. A telnet username and password can just as easily be picked up on a
wired network if no encryption methods are used. Figure 2 shows a decoded TCP stream
from an Ethereal capture. The capture was of a telnet session from the wireless client to a
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Figure 2 Decoded unencrypted telnet session
If the wireless packets are encrypted by Wired Equivalent Privacy, a very basic
encryption algorithm, a casual hacker might be deterred. Access points that use WEP are
identified by Netstumbler. WEP encrypted packets in Ethereal show up as a myriad of
LLC packets. A capture of aWEP encrypted data stream is shown in Figure 3. Although
a few research papers have been published about the breaking of theWEP key algorithm,
the actual decryption ofpackets has not been easy to replicate.
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Figure 3 WEP encrypted telnet session
Using a passphrase of
'hello'
and a 64-bit encryption option generated the four
keys on the Linksys wireless router. The key value is then entered into the wireless client
to gain access to the network. Multiple repetitive ping requests were sent from the
wireless client to a wired network host. Then, on a separate wireless client that did not
have the WEP key value packets were captured into Ethereal. Airsnort, one of the free
tools that claims the ability to break the WEP key algorithm, recommends capturing 5
million packets for a sample size for cracking. Once the Ethereal capture hit 5 million
packets the capture file was loaded into Airsnort. The program identified the MAC
addresses of the hosts, but after running 72 hours the program was unable to reveal the
WEP key used. An independent study done by Rochester Institute of Technology
students Collins and Reznik also experienced difficulties in using Airsnort to break WEP
(Collins and Reznik 7). Fluher, Martin, and Shamir published a detailed analysis of the
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RC4 algorithm that is used in WEP encryption. Their paper outlines the technical
workings of the algorithm and how a program could, if it had enough packet samples,
break the WEP encryption and view the encoded data. No media announcements have
been made about a breach in WEP that resulted in a hacker breaking into a wireless
network. This should not lead administrators into a false sense of security. The Fluher
report gives the technical details to beatWEP that only need better implementations than
WEPCrack or AirSnort.
Another basic level of defense is MAC filtering on the access point. This filter is
a simple list of hosts that are granted or denied access through the access point. By
capturing packets a hacker can see which MAC addresses are allowed to communicate
through the access point (SyDisTyKMoFo). Once that host has left the network, the
hacker can assume thatMAC address using aMAC address masking tool and gain access
past the MAC filter on the access point. If the hacker were to assume the MAC address
while the host is still communicating a denial of service attack would take place. Figure
4 is a screenshot from SMAC showing how the simple interface allows the spoofing of
MAC addresses. Hosts on the local wireless network communicate via MAC addresses
and a segment having duplicate MAC addresses would prohibit reliable data
transmission.
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Figure 4 SMAC MAC address spooling
The final type of attack wireless hackers can attempt is a man-in-the-middle
attack. In this type of attack the hacker positions himself in the middle of the
transmission stream, reading packets from one host and forwarding them on to the next
(Fleck and Dimov). Ettercap is another freely available tool on the Internet that allows
the forging of network packets. Local Area Network communication between hosts is
based on MAC addresses. Ettercap allows the creation ofARP replies with forged IP to
MAC address pairings (Ettercap). In the test network, the default gateway on the
network is 192.168.1.1 with aMAC address of 00:06:25:A3:E6:F2 as shown in Figure 5.
afflj 1 ivnir
^^^'^^^^^l;
Figure 5 ARP cache on host before ARP poison attack
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After using Ettercap to send a forged ARP Reply to the host any communication
that the host would send to the gateway will be directed through the rogue
machine.
More advanced software would be needed to read incoming packets and reassemble them
to be sent out on the wire and avoid detection by the hosts, but this quick and easy attack
could disrupt network communications until discovered. Notice the spoofed MAC
address for 192.168.1.1 now listed in Figure 6.
< C:\WlWOWS\system32\crnd.eKe
icrosoft Windows lUersion 5.2. 3790]
CO Copyright 1985-2833 Microsoft Corp.
C:\Pocunents and Sett ingsMldninistrator>j
Interface: 192.168.1.114 8x2




Figure 6 ARP cache on host after ARP poison attack
III. Layers of Protection
The first layer of protection involves the MAC address of the wireless hosts.
Access points can have MAC filter lists that permit or deny communication based on the
MAC address of the host. This basic level ofprotection will only stop casual hackers and
would be sufficient only for home office networks. Public hot spots could only use this
method effectively if the access point allowed dynamic assignment of valid MAC
addresses. Corporate environments could use this layer ofprotection as long as the list of
hosts does not change frequently: having to manually add and remove hosts for a lookup
table would be a tedious and time consuming job for a network administrator. MAC
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filtering should not be relied on as the sole method of defense due to the ease ofMAC
address spoofing demonstrated in the previous section. MAC filters should only be used
in smaller static networks and not used as the only method ofprotection.
The next method of protection is the encryption of the data transmission. Wired
Equivalency Protocol (WEP) uses a shared key to encrypt the data. WEP defines the use
of a shared key to encrypt data, but does not define key management. WEP allows both a
128-bit key or a 64-bit key for encryption. The access point and all wireless hosts must
use the same key in order to communicate, but unfortunately the same method that breaks
the 64-bit key also works on breaking the 128-bit key (Vaughan-Nichols). This is
because each packet is encrypted with the same RC4 cipher. Made up of a 24-bit
initialization vector and the WEP key, this key is either 40-bit or 104-bit which is why
documentation commonly lists the keys as 64-bit or 128-bit. Each key contains the
initialization vector in plain text: the Achilles heel forWEP. Each key contains a 24-bit
initialization vector with 16,777,216 possible combinations regardless of the key length
(Vaughan-Nichols). Because it is possible to break WEP, other encryption methods
should be used such as VPN or SSL. Using WEP is still better than no security at all.
The next approach combines authorization with encryption. Virtual Private
Networks have been widely used on the Internet to allow home workers to connect to
their office networks. The remote computer presents user credentials, usually a smart
card or username-password combination, to a remote access server. That server then
compares the credentials to an authentication database to determine if access is
14
authorized. The data stream is then encrypted between the client and VPN server
(Webopedia). The VPN server routes traffic between the wireless client and the internal
network. VPN solutions are attractive because many networks already have a VPN
server handling connections from the Internet that can also accept connections from
wireless hosts. The VPN solution, however, is also not a completely secure solution.
Rogue access points can still infiltrate a network and allow a hacker to view traffic as it
passes through. The reason for this breach is because the access point is not validated in
any way
-
only the client's identity is tested. The traffic exposed through a rogue access
point will be encrypted and this solution may be secure for most transmission needs, but
the risk of a rogue access point is present in the solution.
The next sections will explore six different wireless networking solutions. Each
solution will outline the steps taken by a network administrator to setup the solution and
steps needed by the end user to get onto the network to gain access to a server on the
wired network. The sections will also contain explanations of the problems encountered.
15
IV. Testing Wireless Network Topologies
Six scenarios were presented to five computer literate people to attempt
configuration. The years of computer experience and personal aptitude rating are shown
below in Figure 7. The testers were asked how long they have been using a Windows
environment, to rate their own computer aptitude, and finally their profession. As
expected a range of aptitudes was present for testing.
Yes ofExperience Aptitude Profession
Tester 1 8 Advanced IT College Student
Tester 2 7 Advanced IT College Student
Tester 3 8 Intermediate Architect
Tester 4 8 Intermediate Business College Student
Tester 5 5 Basic Coffee shop Barista
Figure 7 Tester Computer Experience
The testers were given the Linksys Wireless-G user guide to configure the Linksys device
and Windows Help for configuring the server and wireless client. At the beginning of
each scenario the environment was set back to a default configuration. This
configuration includes:
Linksys wireless router restored to factory defaults
Windows XP client without any VPN orWEP settings configured
Windows 2003 Server running Virtual Private Network and Internet
Authentication Server services
16
Once the environment was reset to the default configuration the testers were given steps
to complete in order to administratively secure the network and then to
perform an end
user task.
The first task in each scenario was to configure the Linksys wireless router with
the appropriate security: none, MAC filtering, WEP, VPN, RADIUS support, and all
combined. The second task involved getting a Windows XP client onto the now
configured wireless network and accessing a file share on the server. Performing these
tasks tests the clarity of the documentation as well as the usability of the web interface. If
the documentation is inaccurate or the web interface is not usable, then those attempting
to secure wireless networks would be at a disadvantage.
Testers were also asked questions during the process and asked to verbalize their
thought process. The first question was if the Linksys would support the security
measures in the scenario. The second question asks if the Linksys documentation
provides any warnings along with the configuration. The documentation should reflect
the capabilities of the hardware and not provide false senses of security. Testers were
also asked if any feedback was presented to them when accessing the wireless network to
give them information on the security of that network. The tasks and questions are listed
in Appendix G.
17
IV-1. Scenario 1: DefaultWireless Network
A default wireless network is extremely insecure and should never be
used for
data communications. Nothing has been changed in the wired or wireless network.
There is no authorization of clients wanting access to the wired network and there
is no
authorization of the access points. By default the access point sends out a beacon of the
SSID that can be discovered by Netstumbler as shown earlier in this paper. Data is not
encrypted and the transmissions which could include usernames and passwords is easily
captured.
This is the default configuration for the other tests. There was no administrative
setup for the testers to perform. All five testers were able to successfully map a drive to
the server from the wireless client.
IV-2. Scenario 2: MAC Filtering Only
Setting the access point to only allow specified MAC addresses is a simple first
step administrators can take to
allow only specified hosts to communicate with the access
point. Allowed clients are entered into a lookup table on the access point and hosts
wanting to communicate are
compared to the list. There is no data encryption with this
method so data transmissions are again susceptible to eavesdroppers. This setup is also
susceptible to MAC cloning that would allow a hacker to see which MAC addresses are
allowed to communicate and then assume one of those MAC address to communicate
with.
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Setup for MAC filtering is done on the access point only and requires no
modifications to wireless hosts. An administrator logging into the Linksys access point
configuration page is not automatically presented with the ability to filter based on MAC
addresses. The first page displayed is in Figure 8. The Advanced tab leads to the page to
configure MAC filtering.
lie :e:.: screen lets you configure the basic Internet LAII and wireless settings Fo
further information, please see trie User Guide or click the Help button.
vl.30.7. Jul. 8. 2003
Linksys VRTS4G
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Figure 8 Linksys setup screen
The administrator is then presented with a window to enter up to 40 different
MAC addresses. There are two problems with this entry page. The first is that at the top
the page says to enter MAC addresses in xxxxxxxxxx format. However, after the Apply
button is pressed, the MAC addresses auto format into xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx
-
shown in
Figure 9. The difference in what is shown as the input mask and the end formatting could
cause confusion.
19
MAC Address Filter List - Microsoft Internet Explorer
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Figure 9 .MAC filtering screens
The next design flaw is in the checking feature of entered MAC addresses. If the
administrator clicks off the entry box with less than the expected twelve characters when
entering in theMAC address the page prompts that the length is not correct. While this is
a good idea, the page unfortunately clears the text entered. Four of the five people used
for testing had to click off the window in order to remember the rest of the MAC address
to type it in (Appendix G). Each of those four then realized they had to move the MAC
filter window to the side so that they could see the MAC address of the machine they
needed to add. In order to improve this entry page the check for MAC address size
should be performed when the Apply button is pressed.
IV-3. Scenario 3: Wireless Network with WEP Only
WEP encryption for wireless networks should only be used for small or home
office networks. The keys must manually be typed into wireless clients that want to gain
20
access to the access point. Although no cases ofWEP being cracked have made the mass
media, reports across the Internet speak to the vulnerability of the hashing code used to
encrypt the data, and free tools are available online that claim to be able to break WEP
transmissions (Delio).
Administrative setup for WEP first requires the entering of a passphrase on the
access point which is converted into four keys that are used for WEP encryption. The
wireless hosts need to know one of the keys in order to connect to the access point.
The Linksys documentation does state that using WEP encryption is highly
recommended (Linksys 24). The documentation also states that usingWEP can decrease
transmission speeds and that a higher key bit encryption results in a slower throughput.
Appendix A compares the different security measures and the transmission capacity
between a wireless host and one on the wired network. The first step on the access point
is not easy to find because the WEP settings are on the first page but require scrolling to
the bottom of the page to find the option (Appendix G). Notice in Figure 10 that the user
can not see the option to configureWEP settings.
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Tha Setuc screen lets you configure the basic Internel LAII and .vireless settings For
further information, please see the User Guide or click the Help button.
Yl .30.7, Jul. 8, 2003
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Figure 10 Cutoff setup screen
The WEP settings screen in Figure 1 1 is straight-forward except for figuring out
how to exit after generating the keys. All five testers clicked
"Apply"
first after
generating the keys. Two clicked
"Cancel"
to exit the screen, the other three clicked the
X for the window to close it (Appendix G). To make this screen more user friendly the
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Figure 11 WEP screen with no clear exit
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On the client setup side the administrator needs to enter in the key to use to
connect to the access point. The dialog box in Figure 12 is straight forward asking for the
key to be typed in twice to verify the key's value. Once the
"Connect"
button is pressed
pop-up balloon informs that the network has been successfully connected.
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Figure 12 Windows XP prompting for WEP key
IV-4. Scenario 4: Wireless Network with VPN Only
Virtual Private Networks provide the quickest security approach for authorizing
wireless clients and encrypting data. Wireless networks that use VPN as a security
mechanism are potentially exposed to man-in-the middle attacks by rogue access points.
Setting up a VPN connection over a wireless network is the same as creating a
connection that would be used over the Internet. The client enters in the IP address of the
VPN server and presents authentication credentials in the form of a smart ID card or
username-password combination. This information is sent to the VPN server for
authentication and authorization. If the credentials are valid and there are no restrictions
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on the account the VPN server acts as a remote access server encrypting data between
itself and the wireless host and allows the wireless host access to the internal network.
The wireless access point may need to be configured to allow the unmodified
passage ofVPN traffic between the wireless and wired networks. The Linksys router by
default allows VPN traffic to pass through, although only one person found the section in
the Linksys documentation stating that VPN pass-through is enabled by default. All five
testers were able to quickly find the section in the web configuration to enable VPN
pass-
through (Appendix G). There was no mention in the Linksys documentation about using
a VPN tunnel to secure the wireless network.
None of the five testers had problems setting up the VPN connection. Four of the
testers have created VPN connections before and the fifth was quickly guided through the
setup armed with only a VPN server IP address and account credentials to use when
logging in.
IV-5. Scenario 5: Wireless Network with RADIUS
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service is an open standard used to
authenticate remote users to the local network. RADIUS includes authentication,
authorization and accounting all of which are controlled at a central location. The
advantage of RADIUS authentication is that the process can include a wide variety of
authentication methods to a centralized user database (Backman). The advantage of
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using RADIUS for authorization over MAC filters is that a remote access policy can be
centrally controlled. A large corporation with multiple access points would require
adding all wireless hosts to the MAC filter lists. Using RADIUS would only require
configuring the access points to defer authorization to a RADIUS server. The RADIUS
server checks the remote access policy which could allow account access based on group
memberships or even time of day. RADIUS also offers accounting to measure how long
users were connected and report this to a central repository. While none of the five
testers had configured Microsoft's Internet Authentication Server before, they all easily
walked through the configuration of an IAS client to accept requests from the access
point.
Setting up the Microsoft IAS for wireless use is no different than any other remote
access use. The IP address of the client, the access point's address, and a shared secret
that is used by the client and LAS server to encrypt communications during authentication
and authorization are entered into IAS.
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Figure 14 IAS shared secret
Unfortunately the Linksys documentation contains no reference to the hardware
supporting RADIUS. The testers required assistance in finding RADIUS in the Linksys
web configuration page (Appendix G). Having been told that the access point does
support RADIUS, and because the five testers saw RADIUS as an option in the wireless
security section, the testers were able to find the option to enable this configuration. The
Linksys configuration shown in Figure 1 5 allows different RADIUS authentications to be
combined withWEP encryption. Without any further documentation all five testers were
unable to continue. No testers were able to get the wireless host to communicate through
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Figure 15 RADIUS on Linksys includingWEP
IV-6. Scenario 6: All Security Measures in Place
This final scenario put all methods of security into place. This scenario will use
MAC filtering despite the requirement of having to enter in static MAC addresses. The
original plan was in fact to use RADIUS for authorization and not MAC filtering, but the
change was made because all five testers failed to get RADIUS to work in the previous
test. A VPN tunnel will then be created to a server on the wired network. This measure
provides use authentication and authorization as well as encryption of data while on the
wireless network.
Again the testers had no problems repeating steps for the previous scenarios.
They quickly got into the web configuration to enable MAC filtering to only allow their
host access. Nobody this time around had a MAC address entry issue with the interface
deleting partial entries
- refer to problem description in section IV-2. And the testers had
no problem creating the VPN
connection again. All five testers completed the
configurations without any issues (Appendix
G).
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V. Setup Documentation Review
The Linksys documentation gets mixed marks in aiding administrators in setting
up wireless security. The paper documentation had clear steps that a standard network
administrator could follow. The documentation does not explain the risks that wireless
networks are exposed to. During the setup the documentation highly recommends
changing the router's administrator password (Linksys 20). There is no recommendation
to use the MAC filter settings on the Linksys access point. In the Q&A section the
documentation is very misleading. When asked "Will the information be intercepted
while it is being transmitted through the
air?"
the documentation answers "WLAN
features two-fold protection in security. On the hardware side, as with Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum technology, it has the inherent security feature of scrambling. On the
software side, WLAN offers the encryption function (WEP) to enhance security and
access control (Linksys
82)."
In a separate appendix, Linksys does give some security
recommendations. These include changing the default SSID, using WEP encryption, and
enabling MAC address filtering (Linksys 87). Having a side-bar notation during the
configuration section stating that this is a recommended practice would have been a
helpful tip to someone going through the configuration pages during a setup. The
documentation also fails in not mentioning how to configure WPA or the RADIUS
options.
Microsoft has made configuring the steps for wireless security as simple as fill in
the blank. The administrator is isolated from the lower intricacies of security
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management. Unfortunately the only documentation Microsoft has published outlines
configuring 802. IX and WPA scenarios. There was no mention about using a VPN
connection to secure wireless networks. The security documents do list the
vulnerabilities with WEP and the solutions to the problems as addressed by either by
802.1XorWPA.
VI. Administrative Setup Review
Administrative setup is an important part of network configuration and security.
If a network administrator is not aware of the risks with a network configuration he can
not determine whether or not to address them. Documentation plays a part in the
configuration but the higher cost is in maintenance of the system.
The first scenario with no security measures in place requires no administrative
configuration. The network is as easy to set up as it is for hackers to break into. This
setup is strongly discouraged.
MAC filters in the second scenario provide a basic level of defense. In static
networks or networks with a few access points MAC filters only require an initial entry
of MAC addresses. If the network has a high turnover of wireless hosts, keeping the
MAC filters up to date would be a
high administrative overhead. Also, if there are many
access points to configure keeping them up to date could be tedious. MAC filters can
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also be bypassed by MAC spoofing software and should be combined with other security
measures.
WEP encryption in the third should be used for the sole reason that some
encryption is better than none at all. Administrators first have to enable WEP on the
access point and generate the keys to be used. To aid end users administrators should
enter the WEP keys into the wireless hosts. The job of changing WEP keys is a manual
process. The administrator needs to change the access point's keys and then either
change the hosts manually or have the end users perform the task. The frequency of
changing keys is dependent on the security desired. Highly secure networks may want
keys changed daily
-
resulting in a potentially unusable network for end users. Again,
this is the challenge facing administrators in balancing security risks and usability.
Stronger encryption methods such as VPN or SSL should be used for corporate networks
but if resources prohibit either of these, then WEP encryption will thwart casual hackers
and is better than no encryption at all.
VPN connections in the fourth scenario adds another server into the mix of
hardware systems for an administrator to maintain. If the company has an existing
remote access server accepting VPN connections over the Internet, this same server can
also service the wireless network. Administratively this could mean no additional
configurations. However, this could put added demand on server resources depending
on how many wireless clients
would be connecting in addition to regular loads from the
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Internet. Administrators also could encounter training issues in getting end users used to
making VPN connections to get on the network.
Unfortunately the lack of documentation failed to allow testing of the RADIUS
scenario. The administrative setup did entail more configurations on the access point and
the installation of a RADIUS server. Since WEP keys were still used, maintenance of
the keys would be an administrative overhead similar to using WEP alone.
Authentication and authorization is handled by the RADIUS server and compared to a
corporate directory service such as Active Director or NDS. Keeping accounts
centralized does minimize the maintenance required by administrators.
The final configuration adds some flexibility for administrators. MAC filters are
used in this configuration and as such this scenario is only low maintenance for networks
with low host turnover. WEP keys were again used to keep casual hackers at bay.
Fortunately the addition of a VPN connection provides more security to pick up where
MAC filters and WEP leave off. VPN adds authorization of a username building on the
MAC filters on the access point. VPN also adds a stronger encryption scheme thanWEP.
Because of the encryption offered by VPN the WEP keys could be changed less
frequently.
VII. End User Usability
An important part in rolling out security practices is balancing them with end user
usability. End users of a wireless computer network should not have a substantially more
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difficult time getting onto the network than their wired network coworkers. If wireless
networks become unusable because of complex steps required to gain access, then the
gains of mobility and productivity that the wireless networks tout will be negated.
Unfortunately for network administrators the most usable networks are the least secure -
and the most secure networks are the least usable. The tightrope that administrators walk
is finding the balance between security and usability. Fortunately with wireless networks
the most complex parts of security are handled by the administrator and not the end user.
The less than adequate Linksys documentation and unintuitive web configuration for the
access point are never seen by the end user. Instead, the users are padded by Microsoft's
Windows XP operating system.
In the first scenario, there was clearly no security and the highest usability. Users
simply needed to turn on their wireless device. Windows shows any access points that it
is able to get a beacon signal from. The user is presented with a list of access points and
even a warning that the access is not using WEP and that communications between the
wireless host and the access point are not secure. None of the testers had problems
connecting to the default wireless network (Appendix G). The available networks and
security warning are shown in Figure 16 below.
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Figure 16 Connecting to insecure access point
The second scenario again has little effect on the end user but does add a small
degree of security. MAC filtering is an administrative action that puts an access list on
the access point stating which MAC addresses are allowed to connect. End users must
inform the network administrator so their MAC address can be added to the access point.
In this scenario no WEP was used so the end user was again presented with a dialog box
stating that communications on this wireless network are not secure. There is no change
in what the end user sees when usingMAC filtering.
The third scenario introduces a possible configuration step for the end user. WEP
encryption in a wireless network requires the access point and wireless host to have a
shared key to encrypt messages with. The network administrator enters the keys on the
access point. Most administrators would then manually enter the keys into the host so the
host has them when attempting to connect to aWEP enabled wireless network. Windows
again is there to assist end users that do not have the WEP keys already entered. When
Windows attempts to connect to a WEP enabled network a dialog box, Figure 17, is
presented stating that a WEP key is needed to communicate with the access point. The
end user types in the key and is then connected if the key is correct. None of the testers
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had a problem figuring out how to enter in the WEP key required to connect to the
wireless network (Appendix G).
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Figure 17 Windows XP asking for WEP key
The fourth scenario adds an end user step required to gain access to the network
but also adds the second highest security. Corporate road warriors are now familiar with
VPN technology that they use to communicate with company servers behind the
firewalls. The user is first presented with a dialog box to connect to the discovered
network. A WEP key is needed for WEP enabled networks or the user is prompted
before connecting to an insecure network. Once connected to the access point the user
would then have to connect to the VPN server. A usemame and password are required
for authentication and authorization and should be compared to the company's user
account database. This would allow a single sign on for both VPN access and access to
other corporate resources. Single sign-on eliminates the needs for users to remember
multiple account usernames and passwords and increases usability. Users familiar with
using VPN connections
had no learning curve in using a VPN for wireless networks




Due to the inability for the testers to configure the fifth scenario no hosts were
able to get onto the network. In theory the end user would need theWEP key used by the
access point. The user would also have to supply credentials that the access point would
pass to the RADIUS server for validation. If the credentials are valid then access is
granted and no further action is required by the end user.
The last scenario combines three levels of security. The end user has to ensure
that the administrator has their MAC address to add to the MAC filter on the access
point. Windows then presents the user with an available network and prompts for aWEP
key to gain access. After supplying the correct key the user must make a VPN
connection to gain access to the wired network. This scenario provides the highest level
of security of all the scenarios presented. To make this scenario most usable for end
users, an administrator should enter the WEP keys into the wireless host when it is setup
and also use single sign on for the VPN connection. The five testers had no problems
performing the tasks the end user would have to go through (Appendix G). The
combination ofWEP encryption, MAC filtering, and VPN security only resulted in a net
increase for the end user in having to create the VPN connection. Having only one
additional step should be acceptable for
administrators and end users in order to obtain a
highly secure network.
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VIII. Debunking the Myths
Mathew Gast, author of 802.11 Wireless Networks: The Definitive Guide lists
seven security issues in wireless networks that would deter network administrators from
deploying wireless solutions. His security issues are listed below along with explanation
and how the issue is not a security concern or how the solution above that uses all
security levels by combining RADIUS and VPN eliminates the security concern.
Problem #1 Easy Access
Wireless LANs are by their nature easy to locate. Access points send out beacon
frames announcing their presence and communication between wireless devices is sent
out in the open air encrypted or not. Gast does list steps to fix this problem in using WEP
keys to allow access to that wireless ether, putting access points outside the firewall, and
requiring VPN for secure access (Gast).
Problem #2 Rogue Access Points
Gast states that any user can purchase wireless gear, plug it into the network, and
therefore allow outside hackers a path into the network. The solution to this problem is
in securing the wired network. Wired hosts
should be authenticated before they are given
access to the wired network. This would prevent a rogue access point from being
plugged into the network.
Problem #3 Unauthorized Use of Service
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By default access points are wide open, allowing anyone with a wireless adapter
to gain access. To solve this problem, network administrators can use WEP as a basic
level ofdefense and use VPN to secure communications even further.
Problem #4 Service and Performance Constraints
Wireless LANS can have garbage packets sent into the air or other outside
interference generated to degrade the limited band of airwaves used for transmission.
Nobody can stop someone from sending stuff out into the air, but as Gast points out,
network monitoring using the SNMP protocol can alert administrators when a link
becomes saturated.
Problem #5 MAC Spoofing and Session Hijacking
All 802 networks, both wired and wireless, do not authenticate frames by default.
The frames have a source and destination addresses but there is no verification that the
host in the frame was the host that sent the frame. The only solution to this, as Gast
points out, is using a frame-based and user-based authentication which is provided in the
upcoming 802. IX standard.
Problem #6 Traffic Analysis and Eavesdropping
Gast brings light to the open nature of wireless communications. All traffic is
sent out on the air and needs to be encrypted to ensure that unwanted people do not
intercept the data. He recommends that companies useWEP at minimum to encrypt data.
He even states that some new vendor releases ofWEP automatically use dynamic key
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changing to thwart attacks that worked against the original WEP implementation (Gast).
A final recommendation is to use a higher level encryption method for sensitive data,
such as a VPN connection, IPSec, or SSL.
Problem #7 Higher Level Attacks
Wireless networks are sometimes incorrectly placed directly connected to the
trusted internal network. Anyone gaining access to the wireless network automatically
gains access to the trusted wired network. The solution to this problem is in placing the
wireless access point outside the trusted network. Doing this treats wireless traffic as
suspect, like any traffic coming in from the Internet. The traffic passes through a firewall
and other security checkpoints before getting to the secure wired network.
IX. Conclusion
Network administrators are asked to provide solutions to their company that
increase productivity and lower costs. Wireless networks allow users to roam from office
to conference room without losing connectivity to the network. Installation costs for
wireless networks are also less than wired counterparts. However, installation costs and
productivity are not the only measures
that can be used to justify a wireless network.
Wireless networks by their nature are not secure. The medium used for transmitting data
is the open air which is accessible by anything within the transmission range of an
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antenna. Network administrators need to understand the risks associated with wireless
networks before they are added to wired networks.
Since most administrators are not wireless or security experts they have to rely on the
documentation provided by vendors in making their decisions and implementing
solutions. The documentation provided by Linksys in this project only provided basic
information about protection methods such as MAC filters and WEP encryption. It did
not mention any of the vulnerabilities that a wireless network would be exposed to. The
Microsoft documentation did explain the risks with wireless networks, especially WEP
cracking, and offered a solution in using RADIUS authentication and VPN connections.
Problems with the configuration were experienced by all skill levels. The Linksys
configuration page contained some poorly designed sections. These areas were identified
before testing as potential problems and the testers further validated that even by
following provided documentation that problems existed with the interface. The
documentation also failed to provide any warnings about configurations and their security
risks.
Administrators must also contend with the usability of the wireless network. MAC
filters, WEP keys, and VPN credentials all need to be maintained once the network is in
production. If maintenance becomes too cumbersome the administrator could stop
performing some duties and
the security of the network could be compromised.
Likewise, if the network is unusable for end users they may stop using the network or
find ways to circumvent the security measures.
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This paper looked at the different risks that wireless networks are exposed to and also
at the various steps administrators can take to secure their wireless networks. The end
goal was to create recommendations that would allow a secure network to exist that was
easy for an administrator to maintain and did not prohibit the average end user for
gaining access. With that in mind the following security recommendations are being
made:
1. Change the default SSID on the access point but leave the beacon enabled.
The SSID is broadcasted by the access point to announce its presence to anyone
within its transmission range. This is a valuable tool for administrators wanting to
troubleshoot connectivity problems. Wireless hosts must have the same SSID as
the access point in order to communicate with it. The SSID is sent in every
wireless packet, is not encrypted, and should never be used as a layer of defense
(Wi-Fi Planet). Because the SSID is not a security layer having it enabled
provides more administrative troubleshooting assistance than help to a would be
hacker.
2. Enable MAC filters on small networks or networks with low host turnover. MAC
filters provide a basic level of protection that would only stop a casual hacker.
Determined hackers would have tools at their disposal to get past this security
measure. Because of this MAC filters should not be the only line of defense.
3. Enable WEP encryption. Some encryption is better than none, and this is still the
case with WEP. Small networks that use MAC filtering and WEP have reduced
their chances of being hacked than those with no security in place. If resources
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permit, more security layers should be implemented to compliment MAC filtering
andWEP.
4. A VPN connection provides the best method for securing wireless access to a
wired network. VPN technology is trusted to protect data across the entire
Internet and it performs exactly the same way over wireless networks. User
accounts are centrally controlled and access can also be configured based on time
of day or other criteria.
5. The access point should be placed outside the corporate network. Any traffic
coming in from the access point should be viewed as untrusted; similar to any
traffic coming in from the Internet. A firewall should limit traffic coming in from
the access point and only trusted VPN communications should be allowed to pass
to the corporate network.
Administrators need to realize that no network is completely secure. A hole or
exploit will be found for every security step that is put into place. Wireless networks can
be used as a valuable resource for companies wishing to provide mobility to their
employees. It is the job of a network administrator to find those holes, mitigate those
risks, and to do so without compromising usability.
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Appendix A Speed Comparison of Topologies
A major concern about wireless networks is the actual performance of the
network. Wired networks commonly run 100Mbps to the desktops and even gigabit
connections are becoming common for power users. 802.11b as stated in the standard
runs at 1 1Mbps with a fallback to 5.5Mbps, 2Mbps, or 1Mbps based on distance from the
access point and interference (PCWebopedia.com). A valid concern is that adding layers
of security will further decrease transmission speeds over a medium that is already slower
than wired networks. Performance Test, a benchmark application suite from PassMark
Software was used to test transmission speeds. A connection point was installed on a
wired server and another on a wireless host. The chart below summarizes the security
topologies tested and average kilobits per second transmitted over a two minute
timeframe. The wireless host was located one floor below and about 50 feet away from
the access point. Windows showed the connection at 5.5Mbps.





WEP and VPN 2,772
Figure 18 Speed Comparison
As expected, the overhead for the VPN connection would result in a slower speed.
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Figure 20 Transmission test with 64-bit WEP
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Figure 23 Transmission withWEP and VPN
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Appendix B 802.1x Security
802. IX enables "authenticated access to IEEE 802 media, including Ethernet,
Token Ring, and 802.11 wireless networks
(Aboba)."
802. IX contains three major
players. The supplicant is the entity wishing to be authenticated to gain access. In a
wireless network these are the wireless hosts. The authenticator is the link between the
supplicant and the trusted network. The authenticator passes credentials between the
supplicant and the authentication server using Extensible Authentication Protocol. The
authentication server compares credentials from the authenticator and supplicant to
determine the identity ofboth and to grant or deny access. RADIUS support is an option
in the 802. IX as the authentication server but working drafts have started as this is the
expected route to be taking by administrators (Congdon et al).
802. IX involves a series of communications between the supplicant,
authenticator, and authentication server. The supplicant, the wireless host, sends an EAP-
start message to the authenticator, the access point, to gain access. The authenticator
sends an EAP-request identity packet back. The supplicant responds with an EAP-
response packet which the authenticator forwards to the authentication server (RADIUS)
to determine if the supplicant is allowed access. The authentication server validates the
supplicants credentials and returns an accept or reject message to the authenticator. The
authenticator relays the accept or reject to the supplicant. If the message is an accept the
authenticator also opens a trusted port that the supplicant can use to access the wired
network. If the message is a reject the supplicant is asked to send its credentials again
(Geier).
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802. IX is not the end all solution for securing 802 networks. 802. IX networks
are still vulnerable to session hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks. "The hacker
waits for someone to successfully finish the authentication process. Then you as the
attacker send a disassociate message, forging it to make it look like it came from the AP.
The client thinks they have been kicked off, but the AP thinks the client is still out there.
As long asWEP is not involved you can start using that connection up until the next time
out, usually about 60
minutes"
states Professor William Arbaugh who first reported this
breach (Schwartz).
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Appendix C Wireless Protected Access
Wi-Fi Protected Access began as an interim replacement for the potentially
vulnerable WEP encryption scheme. WPA is a software upgrade to operating systems
and device firmware to provide better security until the 802.1 li standard is ratified
(Grimm). Wi-Fi had two goals when being developed. The first was to improve on the
breakable encryption mechanism used by WEP. The second was to introduce user
authentication which previously had to be performed by another layer of security such as
a VPN connection. WPA uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol to encrypt data. TPKI
includes per-packet key mixing, a message integrity check, initialization vector, and a re-
keying mechanism that eliminates the vulnerabilities present in WEP (Grimm). WPA
uses 802. IX and Extensible Authentication Protocol to validate both the user and access
point's identities before allowing data transmissions. WPA in a home office setting can
also use a manually entered shared key, similar to WEP, but WPA uses TPKI for
encryption instead ofWEP.
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Appendix D 802.11 i
802.1 li is an upcoming standard being developed by the IEEE Taskgroup
I. Components of the 802.1 li standard have already been finalized and released for
use. 802. IX uses port-based authentication, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol, and key
management, and is a part of the final 802.1 li standard. 802.1 li will be backwards
compatible with network devices running WPA (Dell Computer Corporation).
Improvements in 802.1 li over current security offerings include creating new
keys at the start of each session (Lawson). Packet integrity checks ensure that packets
being sent are a part of the same data stream (Lawson). Robust Security Network (RSN)
uses dynamic negotiation of authentication and encryption algorithms between wireless
hosts (Cohen and O'hara). This allows wireless networks to start with the standard
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol, and later, when standards are adopted, to upgrade to
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which is a part of 802.1 li. Network Fusion
authors Alan Cohen and Bob O'hara created the figure below to explain Temporal Key
Integritywithin 802.1 li.
Robust SecureNetwork
RSN improves uponWi-Fi Protected Accessby replacing, the
Ion of Temporal Key Integrity Protocolwith the
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Figure 24 802.11 using AES
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Appendix E New Linksys Documentation
The acquisition of Linksys by Cisco and the advancement of security initiatives
explain the security focused revision of the Linksys access point documentation. The
first improvement is in the explanation of the wireless security options. WPA pre-shared
key, WPA radius, radius, and WEP options have the requested configuration fields
explained (Cisco 28). The big addition to the documentation is a new appendix dedicated
to wireless security. The documentation does a great job in explaining how a wireless
network works by comparing devices on a wireless network to everyday cell phones and
cordless phones that also broadcast their signals (Cisco 52).
The documentation even goes into brief explanations of four different attacks
against wireless networks. Passive attacks are defined as attacks where the hacker just
views data transmitted over the air (Cisco 53). Unencrypted data is easily viewed and
even WEP keys can be captured defeating this method of security. Jamming attacks
entail putting garbage waves into the air (Cisco 53). Jamming could be intentional or
unintentional since many common household appliances use the 2.4 GHz frequency. The
next attack is an active attack. In an active attack the hacker has gained access to the
wireless network and has gained access to resources on the wireless and wired networks
(Cisco 54). Man-in-the-middle attacks position a hacker in between wireless hosts and
access points. The hacker accepts data from one and forwards it on to the other while
viewing the contents in transit
(Cisco 54). The documentation includes a message that is
the rule for network security: "No preventative measure will guarantee network security
but it will make itmore difficult for someone to hack into your network (Cisco
55)."
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The documentation then outlines measures that can be taken to secure the wireless
network. Positioning access points so that signals do not stray far from the physical
building and using hard to guess administrator passwords are two of the "Common
Sense"
security practices (Cisco 55). They recommend disabling the SSID but warn that
SSIDs are not a security measure and should not be used as a way to protect a wireless
network (Cisco 56). Enabling MAC filtering on the access point is also recommended as
well as placing the access point outside the corporate firewall to treat wireless traffic the
same as untrusted Internet traffic (Cisco 56). WEP keys "only provide enough security to
make a hacker's job more difficult (Cisco
57)."
Using multiple WEP keys and more
advanced dynamic WEP keys makes the breaking of WEP more difficult. Wi-Fi
Protected Access is only defined as the latest and best standard available for wireless
networks. Unfortunately the documentation does not go further and explain how WPA
eliminates the security problems ofWEP.
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Appendix F Summary Findings
Scenario 1 : DefaultWireless Network
Only one person found the best practice in the Linksys documentation
to change the default SSID and enable WEP.
Scenario 2: MAC Filtering Only
Four testers went to look in the Linksys index forMAC filtering but there was no
mention ofMAC filtering.
Three of the five went to theWireless area of the Linksys config page
-
only two
made the correct Advanced tab selection.
Four of the five had problems enteringMAC addresses due to the config page
performing a length check when clicking off the entry box.
Scenario 3: Wireless Network with WEP Only
Two testers went to the Linksys index but did not find any mention ofWEP.
Two testers tried the Security tab first while two others tried to the Advanced tab
first in the Linksys config page.
Only one tester on the first attempt scrolled down on the main page to find the
WEP settings.
The WEP key entry page also did not have an OK or Done button to allow testers
to leave the screen.
Scenario 4: Wireless Network with VPN Only
Four testers said the Linksys supports VPN. One questioned ifVPN
is the same as VPN pass-through.
Scenario 5: Wireless Network with (RADIUS
The Linksys documentation had no mention ofRADIUS support, but the config
page contains options for RADIUS.
None of the testers completed this scenario.
Scenario 6: All Security Measures in Place
No additional issues than those found above
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Appendix G Testing Tasks and Questions
Scenario 1 : DefaultWireless Network
Are there any warnings or dangers in the Linksys documentation about this configuration?
All five testers were correct in the documentation not warning about a default, noWEP and no filtering
configuration.
Are there any recommended 'best
practices'
in the Linksys documentation?
One person found the note to change the default SSID and to enable WEP.
Are there any warnings or dangers in the Windows documentation about this configuration?
All five testers said found that not using WEP for encryption was not recommended.
Are there any recommended 'best
practices'
in the Windows documentation?
All five said using WEP.
Using the documentation provided by Linksys & Microsoft get the wireless Windows XP computer
to map a drive to \\controller\share. Talk out loud during this process verbalizing any questions or
assumptions you are taking.
All five were able to turn on theWindows XP client and connect to the network share. All five saw the
Windows XP notice that the network was unsecured and were able to connect without a problem.
Scenario 2: MAC Filtering Only
Is the Linksys access point capable of support MAC filtering?
All five correctly said yes.
Are there any warnings or dangers in the Linksys
documentation about this configuration?
All five were correct in the Linksys documentation not containing any warnings about using MAC filtering
only.
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Using the documentation provided by Linksys configure the access point to filter wireless MAC
addresses so that only yourWindows XP computer can gain access to the wired network. Talk
out loud during this process verbalizing any questions or assumptions you are taking to set this
up.
Four of the five testers immediately flipped to the back of the Linksys documentation to look for an index.
There was no index so they went back to the table of contents.
Three of the five went onto the Wireless section of the configuration before making it to the Advanced tab.
Entering in the MAC addresses presented a problem for four of the five testers. The four started typing in
the MAC address but had to click back to the command prompt to get the rest of the MAC address. When
they did this the entry page alerted them that the MAC address was the incorrect length and then deleted all
the text entered.
After you configure the access point from the Windows XP computer map a drive to
\\controller\share Talk out loud during this process verbalizing any questions or assumptions you
are taking while doing this user task.
All five turned on theWindows XP client and were able to map the drive. Again the warning appeared
about the unsecured network, after checking the warning theywere all able to map the drive.
Scenario 3: Wireless Network with WEP Only
Is the Linksys access point capable of supporting WEP encryption?
All five were correct with yes.
Are there any warnings or dangers in the Linksys documentation about this configuration?
All five were correct in the Linksys documentation not containing anywarnings about using WEP only.
Three people found the notice that usingWEP could decrease speed.
Is the Windows XP operating system capable of supporting WEP encryption?
All five were correct with yes.
Are there any warning or dangers in the Windows documentation about this configuration?
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All five were correct with no.
Using the documentation provided by Linksys and Microsoft configure the access point and
Windows XP computer to use WEP encryption. Use the pass phrase hello to generate your
key. Talk out loud during this process verbalizing any questions or assumptions you are taking to
set this up.
All five were correct with no. Two people looked through the Linksys documentation and found theWEP
area but could not figure out what to do next. They went to the configuration webpage. Three of the testers
went directly to the webpage and bypassed the documentation. Two clicked the Security tab first, two went
to Advanced and looked around there first. Only one person scrolled down to find theWEP section on the
first attempt. After getting to the WEP key screen all five were able to generate the keys. All of them also
hesitated on how to exit this screen since there was no OK or DONE button. Two clicked Cancel, three
clicked the upper right X.
After you configure the access point and Windows XP computer map a drive to \\controller\share
Talk out loud during this process verbalizing any questions or assumptions you are taking while
during this user task.
All five testers were able to see the WEP enabled network. Four typed in the key correctly on the first
attempt. One person needed to enter the key in twice. All five then mapped the drive without a problem.
Scenario 4: Wireless Network with VPN Only
Is the Linksys access point capable of supporting a VPN tunnel?
The two more technically savvy testers said yes. Two of the intermediate users said yes. The third basic
user hesitatedwith yes assuming that VPN pass-through was the same as a VPN tunnel.
Are there any warnings or dangers in the Linksys
documentation about this configuration?
All five were correct in the Linksys documentation not containing any warnings about using VPN only.
Is theWindows XP operating system capable of creating a
VPN tunnel?
All five were correct in saying yes.
Are there any warning or dangers in the
Windows documentation about this configuration?
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All five said no. The Windows documentation contains no warnings about using just a VPN tunnel.
The server CONTROLLER with IP address 192.168.1.114 is set up as a VPN server for hosts on
the Internet. Using the documentation provided by Linksys and Microsoft configure the access
point andWindows XP computer to make a VPN connection to CONTROLLER. Talk out loud
during this process verbalizing any questions or assumptions you are taking to set this up.
From the previous uses with the web configuration utility all five clicked on the Security tab to double
check VPN was allowed.
One of the five never used VPN before and was able to followWindows Help after searching for VPN.
The other four went right into Control Panel and set up the connection.
After you configure the access point and Windows XP computer connect the VPN connection and
then map a drive to \\controller\share Talk out loud during this process verbalizing any questions
or assumptions you are taking while during this user task.
All five connected to the unsecured wireless network. All five then connected the VPN and mapped the
drive.
Scenario 5: Wireless Network with RADIUS
Is the Linksys access point capable of supporting RADIUS authorization?
All five said no. The Linksys documentation does not contain any reference to RADIUS.
Are there any warnings or dangers in the Linksys
documentation about this configuration?
All five said no. The Linksys documentation does not contain any reference to RADIUS.
Is the Windows XP operating system capable of supporting
RADIUS authorization?
All five said yes and found the configuration tab in Windows.
Are there any warning or dangers in
the Windows documentation about this configuration?
All five were correct with no. Two noted that RADIUS is more secure
thanWEP.
Using the documentation provided by
Linksys and Microsoft configure the access point, Windows
XP computer, and CONTROLLER to use 802. 1x
authentication. IAS has not been configured on
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CONTROLLER yet. Use the secret secret for the 802. 1x key. Talk out loud during this
process verbalizing any questions or assumptions you are taking to set this up.
This test was skipped by 4 of the 5 testers since no documentation was provided by Linksys. One of the
technically sav\y testers tried to configure RADIUS by guessing settings on the Linksys web configuration
pages but was not able to get it to work.
After you configure the access point, Windows XP computer and CONTROLLER map a drive to
\\controller\share Talk out loud during this process verbalizing any questions or assumptions you
are taking while during this user task.
This test was skipped by all five testers since no documentation was provided by Linksys.
Scenario 6: All Security Measures in Place
Using the documentation provided by Linksys and Microsoft configure the access point, Windows
XP computer, and CONTROLLER to use MAC filtering to allow only yourWindows XP computer
access, create a VPN connection and configure 802. 1x authentication. Use the secret secret
for the 802. 1x key. Talk out loud during this process verbalizing any questions or assumptions
you are taking to set this up.
This test was modified to use MAC filtering, VPN, and WEP since 802. lx did not work. All five testers
were able to get to the correct screens on the Linksys web configuration on the first attempt. Nobody
clicked off the MAC filter list when entering the MAC address into the field. The VPN connection was
also created without a problem on theWindows XP client.
After you configure the access point, Windows XP computer and CONTROLLER, connect the
VPN connection and map a drive to WcontrollerVshare Talk out loud during this process
verbalizing any questions or assumptions you are taking while during this user task.
All five were able to enter in theWEP key to connect to the network. All five were able to connect the
VPN and then map the drive.
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